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This session of the M.I.T. Communications Forum brought together
two representatives from the telephone communications industry.
One panelist represented the perspective of the Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs) and the other represented the
perspective of independent manufacturers of data and voice
communications equipment.
Professor Peter Temin, Chairman of the M.I.T. Department of
Economics, introduced the two speakers and presented the context
for their debate. The debate grows out of the 1984 Consent
Decree which provided for the breakup of the Bell System by
imposing a variety of restrictions on the operations of the
resulting seven RBOCs. Most significant among these restrictions
were prohibitions against offering long distance service outside
of their own operating regions, providing their telephone
customers with information content, and manufacturing products.
In a recent ruling by Judge Harold Greene, upheld in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Consent
Decree's ban on manufacturing was interpreted to include design
and development, as well as the fabrication.
Against this backdrop, the two panelists will discuss whether the
restriction on manufacturing is counterproductive to U.S.
innovation and international competitivenes or an appropriate
safeguard against unfair competition.
The first speaker was Robert W. Stearns, Vice President,
Corporate Marketing, at the Codex/Motorola Corporation. The
company manufactures a wide array of customer premise and network
equipment, and supports over 3800 employees on a worldwide basis.
Codex sells to MNC's and Fortune 500 companies, amongst other
clients. It has been involved in telecommunications policy since
1971, and has seen the industry evolve from a stagnant monopoly
to a dynamic industry.
According to Stearns, today's question can't be understood
without keeping in mind the 1984 Consent Decree and the anti-
trust laws which were its basis. These laws understood monopoly
behavior as bad and free market competition as good, and the 1984
decree has borne out these views. The American consumer now
relies on free market forces which have meant lower prices and
unprecedented technological innovation in the industry. While
the decree split manufacturing from local exchange services, the
nature of the local exchange industry is still monopolistic. So,
to allow the RBOCs to manufacture, would mean dismantling the
foundation upon which the Bell System was broken up.
Stearns pointed out that Judge Greene's ruling resolved an
important point of contention aroung this whole issue, by
maintaining that manufacturing meant the actual fabrication of a
product, as well as product design and development. The Bell
System had used its monopoly to drive out competition at the
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design and development stages, through cross-subsidies between
regulated and unregulated activities. The result of barring
local exchange companies (RBOCs) from manufacturing, according to
Stearns, has been to create a level playing field in the
telecommunications equipment markets. This is consistent with
the philosophy that competitive markets are the best way to
provide products to customers.
Stearns went on to argue that the empirical evidence supports the
logic of his argument. The telecommunications industry is highly
competitive, with an abundance of new products and with strong
growth from current industry participants and new market
entrants. Prices in current dollars have declined significantly
for almost every telecommunications product category from 1970 to
1990. Moreover, consumer choices are now made on quality and
price rather than on the basis of what a monopolist feels like
bringing to market. Products never before dreamed of by carriers
are now available (e.g. the T1 and the statistical multiplex).
An important reason for this is because carriers are not
interested in creating products that would reduce their revenue
from transmission services. Instead, it's been independent
manufacturers that have introduced the innovative products.
Stearns said that the value a regulated monopoly can bring to the
competitive equipment market is none. In fact, BOC participation
in manufacturing could only hurt the market because they would
drive out competitors by engaging in anti-competitive practices.
In any case, he said that the RBOCs still can engage in
manufacturing-related areas and that they are restricted from
only those stages which are most susceptible to cross-
subsidization. He went on to say that the RBOCs need to enter
into relationships where both parties (supplier and customer) can
prosper.
In response to the RBOCs argument that companies like Codex don't
want more competition, Stearns argued that this is not so. He
said that Codex is not afraid of competition and that it has
always welcomed new entrants into the market. It just doesn't
want a monopoly in the industry that can engage in anti-
competitive practices. He also rejected the RBOCs' argument that
accounting safeguards already prevent the RBOCs from cross-
subsidizing their equipment operation with revenues from their
local exchange service. He argued that the accounting standards
weren't workable because they weren't developed with an eye
toward this issue and, what's more, that they don't have
attendant policing mechanisms.
Stearns said that the RBOCs' argument that price caps remove
incentives for cross subsidization is fallatious. Because the
price cap (which governs the maximum price an RBOC can charge for
its services) is lowered if an RBOC makes an excessive profit,
there will be an incentive to reduce the profits by engaging in
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cross-subsidies, for example, cost-shifting from its equipment
side to its regulated service side. Moreover, the issue is not
simply one of cost, but of preserving a climate which is
favorable to innovation. He rejected the RBOCs' contention that
they would continue to buy other companies' products if allowed
to manufacture. He held that the RBOCs would be motivated to buy
their own affilates' products, even if poorer in quality, because
of the investment in their own manufacturing operations. As for
the argument that a separate subsidiary structure would prevent
anti-competitive practices, Stearns cited the fact that this
never worked in the case of Western Electric. Finally, Stearns
noted that the FCC could not monitor the anti-competitive
practices that would emerge with a change in the rules, because
the FCC does not have the manpower and funds to enforce the
regulations. In fact, he said, that's precisely why the
monopolies were broken up in the first place.
Stearns turned to the argument that the 1984 agreement has
created the current trade deficit in telecommunications
equipment. He said that the RBOCs are completely wrong about
this point. The trade deficit is the result of a variety of
other factors, including the lower cost of wages in East Asian
countries, unfair trade barriers, and distorted exchange rates in
the mid-1980's. He pointed out that the decline in the trade
balance began prior to 1984, the point in time that the
manufacturing restriction took effect. Moreover, Stearns noted
that there has been a tremendous improvement in the trade deficit
in the past two years, which a result of the weakening of the
dollar, the liberalization of overseas markets, more agressive
U.S. marketing practices overseas, and the changeover to the new
harmonized system of tracking trade. The dramatic rise in the
export of telecommunications products is the most important
reason in the improved balance. He cited the fact that the
telecommunications trade deficit is largely related to products
at the low end of the industry (e.g. phones, answering machines)
and that these products are largely imported by AT&T and the
RBOCs. He also said that the U.S. maintains a surplus in data
communications products and in the high end of the market.
According to Stearns, the RBOCs go beyond misusing the trade
balance issue to try to rescind the manufacturing restriction.
He argued that RBOC manufacturing would be a negative force for
the trade balance, since it would have a negative impact on
innovation in U.S. industry by creating the non-competitive
conditions which ultimately would reduce the number of
telecommunications companies involved in the industry.
Stearns commented on how difficult it's been for companies like
Codex to meet the RBOCs head on-in this debate. He noted that
the RBOCs have a strong lobbying presence in Washington, D.C.,
have enormous financial resources at their disposal, and they the





In closing, Stearns stated that the RBOCs must play a
constructive role in the U.S. telecommunications industry in the
21st century. He remarked on the important role they have to
play in the development of digital and optical broad-band
communications equipment that will help the United States to
remain a first-rate power. These developments will provide the
RBOCs with significant profits. He cautioned, however, that
there is no place for the RBOCs in markets which are already
competitive.
The second panelist was Casimir S. Skrzypczak, Vice President,
Science and Technology, at the NYNEX Corporation. He began by
noting that he was pleased to be addressing a group of scientists
and engineers who, he believed would be able to appreciate the
detrimental effects of the manufacturing restriction on the
caliber and quality of the telecommunications industry in the
United States, as well as its detrimental impacts on the
competitiveness of the United States in today's expanding global
economic environment.
Skrzypczak remarked that he has difficulty in trying to justify
the Manufacturing Consent Decree by trying to apply pre-
divestiture Bell Systems arguments to a company like NYNEX. He
maintained that his point is especially valid given that NYNEX
and its subsidiaries have never manufactured, nor do they have
any factories for manufacturing.
He also noted that the tendency to treat the seven RBOCs as a
single group is a mistake. They are not monolithic and people
who treat them as such are simply trying to create a smokescreen
for their own self-serving arguments. He set out to approach the
debate from the perpsective of a technologist, given his position
as chief technologist at NYEX and given his previous experiences
at Bellcore in network planning activities.
The main question at hand for Skrzypczak is "what impact is the
manufacturing restriction having on the development of
telecommunications equipment and services in the United States?"
He maintained that the people who created the present structure
have a lack of understanding about the process of product and
service creation in the telecommunications industry. He outlined
the process as a fragile one, with five major steps: (1) basic
research: this phase keys in on the development of a basic
understanding of technology, without a specific focus on how the
knowledge might be used; (2) applied research: this stage
concentrates on how to apply knowledge to a specific application
or area of customer needs: (3): generic requirements: this phase
focuses on specifying the particular characteristics of the
product or service you're trying to create; (4) manufacturing
design: this phase addresses the specific configuration of the
product you're trying to produce; and (5) fabrication: this
involves the final assembly.
The manufacturing restriction is based on the unrealistic
assumption that you can draw a solid line between phases three
and four. Skrzypczak argued that this is impossible. In fact,
all of the stages require continuous interaction, and the most
critical interrelationship is between pphases three and four.
But Judge Greene's ruling misses this point.
Skrzypczak commented that the most critical ingredient for
success in the telecommunications industry is constant contact
with the customer. Product development is a constant learning
process and a constant iterative process, in which the developer
learns from the customer and vice versa. An artificial wall
built between the knowledge of the service need gained through
customer contact and the ability to passs this knowledge along
through the manufacturing phase can only hurt the
telecommunications industry. According to Skrzypczak, this is
what the current structure does.
Moreover, Skrzypczak maintained that Judge Greene's rulign has
created a set of dfinitions that are very confusing to
technicians; these definitions make little sense and are next to
impossible to discern in practical terms.
The RBOCs companies have no clear understanding of what we can
and can't do anymore, because we a working within a fundamentally
flawed system whose operational definitions often do not relate
to the realities of rapidly evolving technologies. The RBOCs
comprise 50% of the R&D in the U.S. telecommunications industry,
but the current strucutre does not allow us (the industry and the
consumers) to make the most efficient use of this investment.
Skrzypczak followed with an example to support his claim. NYNEX
tried to develop a prototype for a possible wireless technology
for use in trading networks. Because of the uncertainty of the
dividing line between permitted generic requirements development
and forbidden manufacturing design, we were unable to transfer
the full extent of our prototype experience and knowledge to
facilitate the creation of a manufacturable design, thus
substantially delaying our ability to bring this product to
market.
Skrzypczak then addressed the view reflected in the manufacturing
restriction that, if permitted, the RBOCs would team up with
foreign companies and therefore work to the detriment of the
United States. Skrzypczak argued that this is not true; rather,
NYNEX would prefer to team up with small U.S. sttart-up frims who
need funding and/or customer knowledge about the nature of the
market they want to serve. The best results would be those team-
ups where there would be constant contact and interaction with
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the manufacturer and the RBOCs. Clearly, this can best be
achieved by teaming with U.S. firms and not with foreign
manufacturers.
He also looked at the argument that the RBOCs would team up with
a large central office switch manufacturer (i.e. a foreign
company) to eliminate the last U.S. central office switch
manufacturer (AT&T). Skrzypczak maintained that this is also
fallacious. He said that NYNEX policy has been to expand the
number of central office switch manufactureres it utilized
because this mankes them more competitive and therefore results
in lower prices for NYNEX and its customers.
Turning to what sort of path NYNEX would pursue if the
manufacturing restriction were lifted, Skrzypczak had the
following comments to offer. If the manufacturing restriction
were lifted, NYNEX wouldn't try to replicate the Western Electric
Bell Systems relationship of the past, as many people contend.
In fact, our motivation is to obtain the maximum benefits and
returns from the $200 million we put into R&D each year. We ould
try to do this by teaming up with companies to produce new
capabilities and also to obtain an appropriate return on
investment through such cooperative ventures in manufacturing.
That's essentially the nature of what NYNEX would do, and I fail
to see how that would threaten the viability, range, and breadth
of competition and products in the U.S. telecommunications
industry.
Skrzypczak maintained that some independent manufacturers try to
mischaracterize how NYNEX would participate in the manufacturing
arena. The focus of NYNEX's efforts in manufacturing would be to
compliment existing manufacturers by coupling our knowledge and
understanding of customer needs and our knowledge of technology
gained through our investments in R&D to meet customer needs that
go unmet today by manufacturers.
In concluding, Skrzypczak remarked that the empirical evidence
does not allow one to conclude that the manufacturing restriction
has in any way anhanced the telecommunications industry.
Question & Answer
The first question asked about the possibility of other
restrictions which might be handed down in the event that the
manufacturing restrictions were lifted to allow the RBOCs to
manufacture. Skrzypczak answered that there could be any range
of possible restrictions which might be imposed in that sort of
situation. He noted that, in his view, the best case scenario
would be one in which there would be no additional restrictions,
so that the RBOCs could use any technology in any way to help
their customers. Based on existing legislation under
consideration, Skrzypczak said that there may be restrictions on
the amount of equipment the RBOCs could by from an in-house
manufacturer. Another possibility would be the requirement of
basing the sale price to internal affiliates on the sale price to
external units. Yet another issue under discussion concerns a
limitation (40% is the number currently being bandied around) on
the non-U.S. portion or value added to U.S. pieces of
manufactured equipment. A final possibility concerns percent
ownership restrictions on a NYNEX manufacturing subsidiary.
The second question remarked on Skrzypczak's point that the
current situation is, overall, non-beneficial to the U.S.
telecommunications industry. The questioner noted that the
manufacturing restriction has created a situation in which a
group of people is designed generic requirements with no real
feel for what's needed at the manufacturing level. The question
is how to deal with this situation, and one possible option might
be to invite both domestic and foreign manufacturers to share
with us what they're working on.
Stearns responded that there is a simple answer as to why U.S.
manufacturers haven't responded to the call to share their
information with the RBOCs. He said that independent
manufactureres just don't have any confidence that the RBOCs have
any understanding of what the markets want. He disagreed with
Skrzypczak's point that the customer doesn't know from the outset
what he wants, stating that, indeed, the customer knows exactly
what it wants. He also found it inconsistent that NYNEX starts
by saying that they have no knowledge of manufacturing, but then
provides a model of how the manufacturing process works.
The questioner countered by saying that what's really going on
here is that the manufacturing companies want their own monopoly,
which is why they continue to support the manufacturing
restriction.
Skrzypczak intervened to say that this discussion, just as with
the broader debate on the manufacturing restriction issue, is not
a black and white one. He pointed out that, in fact, the issue
is one of greys - there are no black and white answers. The
point is that all parties (i.e. the two speakers) seem to agree
that what's need is more direct contact with the customer. He
submitted that, when it comes to major steps forward, most
customers don't understand the range of future technological
application possibilities. It's here that the manufacturers and
the RBOCs could offer valuable pooled advice.
Stearns agreed that there is a definite need for continuous
customer contact. But he also noted that the RBOCs use this
point to conceal the fact that they want to get everything right




iteration if they perceive the investment as too great. The
manufacturers, he maintained, recognize that the first iteration
won't necessarily be the best and they are committed to going
beyond that to get consistency over time.
Another question turned to Skrzypczak's apparent view that what's
past is past and that the same problems which developed prior to
the divestiture and manufacturing restrictions won't recur.
Skrzupczak commented that this view comes from his point that
people mistakenly take the RBOCs as a monolith, and that this is
not correct. The seven RBOCs are independent and have different
strategies. Interestingly, there is probably more competition
over strategy and success amongst the seven than many people
appreciate. Secondly, he noted that there would be a very
different role for manufacturing in a company like NYNEX than
there would have been in a company like AT&T in its pre-
divestiture days. Finally, most of the NYNEX management came out
of the service, rather than the development and manufacturing
parts of AT&T, which provides an added focus and appreciation of
end customer needs. He explained that NYNEX's manufacturing
strategy is not exclusively manufacturing bottom-line driven.
The next question asked Stearns why he is opposed to letting the
RBOCs compete on a level playing field which would come through
open market competition in the manufacturing area, particularly
since they could contribute a lot to new activities in the
manufacturing realm.
Stearns answered that his concern lies with the RBOCs' abilities
to cross subsidize and to offer preferential procurement
treatment to captive manufacturers. He is not willing to compete
with a monopoly that will cross subsidize. And while,
theoretically, restrictions could be imposed to prevent that from
happening, enforcement of these restrictions would be nearly
impossible. Stearns said that he is not convinced by the
apparently straightforward intentions of the RBOCs in this whole
matter.
The next question turned to NYNEX's proposed relationship with
small companies, in a situation where themanufacutring
restriction would be lifted. The questioner noted that because
NYNEX controls access to its local loops, they might then use
this ability to manipulate how the vendor equipment integrates
with the NYNEX network.
Skrzypczak remarked that because NYNEX makes its money from
providing network services, it would only be in their interest to
increase the number of people and equipment able to use the
network. So, it would not be in NYNEX's interest to restrict
vendors.
The next questioner observed that the real question may not be a
concern over the manufacturing restriction per se, but over how
the legislation has been written. He offered that, if the RBOCs
don't want to become monopolistic manufacturers, then maybe it's
possible to get around the problem by rewriting the legislation.
The question might be one of information services, and of how to
allow more cooperation between independent manufactureres and the
big companies under the system as it now exists.
Skrzypczak indicated that there are numerous examples of where
the manufacturers have not stepped up to the challenges of such
cooperation. He pointed to the case of British Telephone and
their attempts to get manufacturers interested in the
breakthrough technology of passive optics.
In closing, both Skrzypczak and Stearns agreed that they
appreciated the other's point of view and the positive spirit in
which it had been offered. They also agreed that the final
solution must be one that benefits the U.S. telecommunications
industry as a whole, particularly since this is an issue
affecting the national interest.
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